Auctions vs. Negotiations by Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer




Working Paper No. 4608




Thanks to Margaret Meyer, John Roberts, and Lawrence Summers, as well as other colleagues
at Stanford Business School and Oxford University for valuable comments. This paper of part
of NBER's research pmgram in Corporate Finance. Any opinions expressed are those of the
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negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition.
Jeremy Bulow Paul Kiemperer
Graduate School of Business St. Catherine's College
Stanford University Oxford
Stanford, CA 94305 UNITED KINGDOM
and NBERAuctions vs. Negotiations
1.. Introduction
Consider a board of directors attempting to do its fiduciary duty ofmaximizing
shareholder wealth. In incumbent management's hands thecompany is worth its
current, publicly observed, stock price. A raider, or several raiders, privatelyap-
proach the board, offering to buy the company at a premium to the current price.
The raiders are willing to negotiate on price.
The board considers several options. The first option is to negotiate with the
raiders for the best possible price. The second option is to publiclyannounce that
the company is for sale, and hold an open auctionamong the raiders and any other
bidders who may then emerge. A third option is to negotiate with theraiders,
maintaining the right to hold an auction subsequently if the negotiations do not
lead to a sale.
Which option is best? The advantage of negotiating is that the sellermay
be able to bargain the raiders into agreeing topay a higher price by, for example,
credibly threatening not to sell if the buyers' offers are too low, making an offer to
one buyer that depends on information learned from other buyers, and maintaining
the prerogative of discriminating among buyers' bids. We assume that the directors
are extremely skilled at negotiations; in fact, we assume that they can use whatever
sales mechanism will maximize expected profit from a given set of bidders.
The advantage of proceeding directly to an auction is that this is probably the
strategy that will ensure maximum participation in the bidding.' The problem is
that publicizing a sale to increase the number of biddersmay make it harder to
1Apublic auction not only attracts extra bidders through the extra publicity,
but also attracts extra bidders if bidding is costly, because for any given num-
ber of bidders the expected surplus per bidder is higher in an auction than if the
seller negotiates optimally. (For analysis of optimal seller strategies with costly bid-
der participation, see Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993), McAfee and McMillan (1987a),
McAfee and Vincent (1991), and Shleifer and Vishny (1986).)
Inegotiate effectively. In fact we will assume that putting thecompany "in play" by
making it public knowledge that it is for sale makes it impossible for thecompany
to be taken off the market, and forfeits all the seller'snegotiating power, forcing the
seller to simply accept the highest bid, provided it exceeds the current stockprice.2
Finally, negotiating while maintaining the right to hold an auction if negoti-
ations do not produce a sale reduces the cost of a failednegotiation, but makes
negotiation less effective —buyersknow that if none of them accedes to the seller's
demands then they will have another chance to purchase thecompany.
The point of our paper is that the choice between theseoptions is clear: Pro-
vided only that the auction will attract at leastone extra bidder it yields the highest
expected revenue, under standard assumptions. A direct auction with N+ I bidders
beats an optimal negotiation with N bidden, and is alsosuperior to negotiating
with N bidders and then holding an auction with those Nbidders plus an additional
bidder if negotiations fail.
We can prove these results even thoughwe assume that a negotiator can use
the techniques of mechanism design toprecominit to any sales mechanism that
maximizes the expected revenue from Nbidders, an assumption which undoubt-
edly overstates the bargaining ability ofany real life negotiator. Rirthermore, our
assumption that an auctioneer must accept the highest offeramong N + 1 bidders,
no matter how low, probably understates thepower of a seller who holds an auction.
Therefore, our result that an auction with N + I bidders isbetter in expectation
than any negotiation with N bidders isconservative in some important respects.
2Onereason why a company might be forced to take thetop bid once it an-
nounces an auction is that U.S. takeover law has theconcept of a "moment of
inevitability" at which a sale is thought to becomeinevitable, and "At this point,
the duty of the board is said tochange and become in effect that of a fair auctioneer
who must seek the highest bid andmay not consider long-run value maximization..."
(Choper el. aL(1989), p.l152). A secondreason is that the business of a company
whose future ownership is thought to beuncertain may be damaged until the ques-
tion of ownership is resolved and itmay be hard to credibly withdraw the company from the market. See,e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1988).
2In short, sellers, whether they are boards of directors of publicly heldcornpa-
nies, or governments privatizing public sector companies, should focus on ma.xirniz-
ing the number of potential bidders for their assets and should generally refuse to
bargain with bidders who wish to pre-empt the auction process.3
Section 2 presents our model, which encompasses both private values andcom-
mon values. Section 3 shows how to compute the expected revenue from any arbi-
trary sales mechanism that a seller might choose.
In section 4 we describe the optimal negotiating strategy. In general, it is to
hold an English auction among the N buyers until the top bidder is revealed. At
this point, the seller should make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the last remaining
buyer, with the exact amount of the offer determined by the information that the
seller learns through the auction bidding. (Often the take-it-or-leave-it offer will
simply be the price at which the next-to-last bidder exits the auction.) We then
compare the expected revenue from negotiating to that from a simple auction.
Section 5 gives some examples of our results.
In section 6 we show that moving directly to an auction is preferable to negoti-
ating with the existing bidders before moving to an auction. Thus the seller should
never accept any "lock-up" agreement that a buyer is willing to offer in return for
not holding an auction with more buyers.
Section 7 extends our results to multiple unit auctions, and demonstrates an
analogous result about the value of attracting new customers relative to the value
of being able to charge a monopoly price.
The remaining sections show the effects of relaxing the assumptions in our basic
model, and condude.
By assuming a single seller, interested only in expected revenue we are ab-
stracting from issues such as shareholders' individual incentives to sell (see, e.g.,
Grossman and Hart (1980), Hirshleifer and Titman (1990), and Holmstron and
Nalebuff (1992)), or management's interest in retaining control (see e.g. Hams and
Raviv (1988)).
32. The Model
A seller has been approached by N ￿ 1 potentialbuyers. If she chooses to
negotiate with them, she may impose any mechanism she wishesincluding, for
example, discriminating between buyers, enforcing no-resale provisions, andcredibly
committing to consider only offers above some minimum amount. Alternatively she
may choose to hold an auction. The auction will attract an additional N + 1-st
bidder, but once the auction is announced, the seller is then restricted torunning a
conventional ascending bid auction and to selling theobject to the last remaining
bidder at the price at which the next to last bidderdrops out.
We normalize the seller's value of the object tozero. Each bidder i observes
a private signal i.Wewrite T for the vector (i1,.,tp,÷i). Conditionalon the
signals of all the potential buyers i =l,...,N+ I, the asset would be worth vj(T)
to bidder i. We assume that v1(T) is differentiableeverywhere, and 8t(fl> 0and ￿0 Vi,j.
Withoutloss of generality we can normalizeso that all the t1 are uniformly
distributed on 10,1).That is, a signal of t =.23is more optimistic than 23 percent
of the signals bidder I might receive and lessoptimistic than 77 percent. In the
special case of private values v(T) is a functiononly of t1,andin the special case
of pure common values v1(T) =v1(T).
We write T' for (t1,.. . iv). Contingenton the first N signals we let the
expected value of the asset to bidder i be v((T")E,,, {v(T)). (More generally,
we write E1 {f(z, y)J for the expectation off(x,y)contingent on y and with respect
to x.)
Let p1(T) be the probability thatbuyer i will receive the object (in equilibrium),
contingent on the vector of signals T, and let pr(TN) bethe probability that i will
receive the object (in equilibrium),contingent on TN. Let 51(t1) equal the expected
surplus to buyer I. We let dT!adtj,...,dt_1,dt1+1, ...,dipj,and let IN and
represent N and N + I integrals from 0 to 1, respectively.
4We also make the following assumptions:
A.1 All bidders are risk neutral.
A.2 While t1 is private information to bidder i, the value functions v(.) are common
knowledge.
A.3 v(1,1,1,...1) =iY< oc.
A.4 v(O,. ..0)￿ 0. Every bidder is a "serious bidder" willing to make an opening
offer of zero, the seller's value, in an open English auction.
A.5 The variables i1,t2 .. .ijq4.are independent.
A.6 Symmetry: Bidders' value functions are symmetric so v1(t1,...,..., t1,...)=
v1(tj,... ,i1,... , ti,...),andbidden choose symmetric strategies in a conven-
tional ascending bid auction.4
A.7 t1 > t, * v1(T)> v3(T). (The bidders with the highest signals have the
highest values.)
A.8 We define MRj(T)j[(i—t1)v1(T)) =vj(T)_(i_ij)OT),and analogously
MRr(TN) vf(TN)_(1 _t1)avçr")= E1÷,{MRj(T)}.We assume that
t > * MR1(T) > MR1(T).
Assumption A.8 is a standard regularity condition in auction theory. Note
that (1 —11)v€(T)is the expected revenue the seller would receive from i, if all the
signals except i1 were publicly known and the seller offered i a take-it-or-leave-it
price of v1(T). (This price would be accepted with probability (1 —t1).)Thus MR1
is the marginal revenue from i, that is the increase in this expected revenue if the
asking price were reduced, per extra unit sold, and our assumption corresponds to
the standard assumption that marginal revenue is downward sloping.
We relax A.5 through A.8 in sections 8, 9, and 10.
Thus the bidder with the highest signal always wins such an auction. With
pure common values (but not, it is believed, for any other cases of our model —see
Bikhchandani and Riley (1993)), it is possible to construct asymmetric equilibna
in which the bidder with the highest signal does not always win such an auction.
53. Profitability of Alternative Sales Procedures
We begin by calculating the profitability ofany arbitrary sales mechanism to
Nbidders,i=1,••.N.
Begin by noting that in any sales procedure, the 1thbidder,with signal t1
cannot, if he is behaving optimally, gain by deviating to the strategy he would use
if he had signal 2/, so
S(t) ￿ S(t')
—vr(ti,.,t_1, t/, ..,LN)Jpr(21, ...,t/, ...,iN)dTE
V
So S(i) has derivative
20.!•\ PA. Ni'rN ______ — / VU1I.L) N,'rpN.rrN 25— I As c1
JN—i(hi
andtherefore
S(x)= S1(O) + JJ
Ovf4t(TN)pr(r)dTN.
tj=ON—i





equals (integrating by parts)
f (s1o+ —t)8v((T")
pr(TM) rN)
Now expected seller profitscan be written as the expected value of the good
to the winning bidder, EifNV!T(TN)PtJ(TN)dTN,less the expected surplus of
the N bidden. It follows that
Lemma 0: The expected profits froma sales procedure involving N bidders
equal >(fNMRTP1rCTM —S(O)).
6This interpretation of the seller's profits in terms of the marginal revenues of
the bidders weighted by their probabilities of receiving the object follows Bulow
and Roberts (1989) but extends their private-values model to the general common-
values case. The result is also a straightforward extension of Myerson's (1981) model
which is restricted to a specific form of common values in which players' values are
additive functions of signals.
4. Auctions vs. Negotiations
Optimal Negotiations
Lemma 0 implies that no sales procedure can earn greater profits than apro-
cedure in which S(O) =0Vi (obviously no sales procedure can give any type of
bidder a negative expected surplus), the good is always given to the bidder i for
whom MRr(TN) is largest if that value is greater than zero (that is, ptt(TN) =I
for this bidder and pf(T") =0for all other bidders, j1), and the good is not
sold if the largest MR((TN) is negative (that is, pj(T') =0Vi in this case).5
But all this can be achieved under our assumptions by using the following
modification of a standard open English auction. Let the price rise continuously
and, at the point at which the next to last bidder drops out, offer the last bidder
a take-it-or-leave-it price equal to the maximum of the current price and the price
this bidder, i, would just be willing to pay if his MR.?(TN) were zero (given the
information that can now be inferred about other bidders' signals). To see this
yields the desired outcome, observe that if the seller uses this procedure each bidder
will drop out of the bidding at the price he would just be willing to pay if all the
remaining active bidders had signals equal to his own,6 so (i) a bidder of the lowest
$ tinder our assumptions, the probability of two bidders having identical MRs is
zero, and any allocation suffices in this case.
6 To see this, note that, given all other bidders follow this rule (and infernng the
signals of bidders who have dropped out using this assumption), a bidder is happy
(unhappy) to find himself the winner at any price below (above) this stopping pnce.
Strictly, bidders with very low signals are indifferent about participating since they
know that they would never meet the seller's take-it-or-leave-it price. However, the
7possible type, t =0,wins with probability zero, so S(0) =0,(ii) the bidder, i, who
has the highest signal L, will be the final bidder, so the winner (ifany) will also be
the bidder with the highest MRr(T"), and (iii) the signaltjofevery bidder jwho
drops out can be inferred by the price at which that bidder leaves the auction,so the
final take-it-or-leave-it price can be set using precise information about all theother.
bidders' signals to ensure that the high bidder i wins if and only if MRI?'(TN)￿0.
It follows therefore that
Lemma 1: The expected profits from an optimal negotiation with N bidders
equal ETN {max{MRr(T'), MR.'I(TN),... , MR(T),01).
We note that unless bidder valuations are "private,"so that v(.) depends only
on t1, information about other valuations is useful in setting the final take-it-or-
leave-it price, so that alternative mechanisms which donot reveal the signals of the
losing bidders will not in general be revenue equivalent to the mechanismdescribed.
Auctions
Following the derivation of Lemma 0, the expected profits froma sales proce-
dure to N + 1 bidders are
E(j MR,(T)p1(T)dT_S(0)). N+1
Butin any standard auction with symmetricbidders,7 the bidder with the
highest actual signal wins the auction,so p1(T) =1if t is the highest actual
signal and p(T) =0otherwise, and a bidder of the lowest possible type wins with
probability zero, so S(O)= 0.Therefore
seller can induce all bidders toparticipate at an arbitrarily snail cost in expected
revenue by committing to foregoing the take-it-or-leave-it offerwith a probability
approaching zero and to always accepting the highest bid in thisevent.
Including, for example, a Dutch auction, or a first-price sealed bidor a second-
pnce sealed bid auction, as well as theopen ascending (English) auction on which we are focusing.
8Lemma 2: The expected profits from an auction with N + 1 bidders equal
Er{max{MR1(T),MR2(T),.
Lemmas I and 2 allow us to prove our main theorem:
Theorem: The expected profits from an auction with N + 1 bidders exceed the
expected profits from a negotiation with N bidden.





N <VN+l(T ,0)— — ((1—tN+1)vN+1(T ,tf.J4.)Jdi.f1
=JMR;::(T)dtN+l =E+,{MRN+l(T)}.
So, in either case, for all T",
max{MRr(T"), 01 ￿ max{Eg4, {MR1(T)}, {MRN+l(T)} }
￿Et,{max{MRi(T),. ..MRN+I(T))},
and since the inequalities are strict for a set of T" that occur with positive proba-
bility, we have
ETN {max{MRr(T'),.. .MR5(T"5,0}) <ET{max{MRI(T),. MRv+i(T) }.
Q.E.D.I
Theargument of the proof is straightforward: The expected marginal revenue
of a bidder computed over all his possible values equals his lowest possible value
(just as the average marginal revenue of any demand curve computed up to some
quantity equals the average revenue, that is, the price, at that quantity), and the
9lowest possible value of any serious bidder exceeds zero by assumption. Thus in
expectation the MR of the (N + l)st bidder is at least as good as the zero that
negotiation provides. But the added variance of the MR of the (N + 1)st bidder is
also helpful, given that the option of choosing one of the Ma, of the first N bidden
is available. So the auction is clearly better.
Note, however, that there is no simple dominance relationship between an
auction with N + 1 bidders and a negotiation with N bidders. For example, an
auction with two bidders with private values drawn uniformly from [0,11 performs
worsethana negotiation with 1 bidder, averaged across states in which the first
bidder's value actually exceeds f(thatis, MR exceeds 0), but performs better than
the negotiation averaged across the remaining states. Thus it is only by expressing
expected profits in the forms given in Lemmas 1 and 2 that our result becomes
apparent.
5.Examples
If the seller negotiates with one bidder, with a value drawn froma uniform
distribution on [0, 1), then it is easy to check her optimalstrategy is to offer a
take-it-or-leave-it price of .Theseller's expected profit is .Alternatively,an
auction with two bidders, each with private valuations drawn independently from
this distribution would yield expected profit equal to theexpected second highest
valuation, or
More generally, the expected profit from anopen auction with N + 1 >1
bidders whose values are drawn independently froma uniform distribution on [0, IJ
is y%i. Since v6= tai,MR1 =u(2i1—1),so MR1 =0at t1 =1/2.Therefore,
the optimal negotiation strategy is torun an auction with a minimum price of .
Thus,the expected profit from negotiating with N bidden will be N_)4f"v, less
than the profit from the absolute auction with N+ I bidden.
As a second example, consider a common value auction in which thetrue value
of an item is the same to each bidder,namely the product of i1, t2, andwhere
10all the signals are drawn independently from a uniformdistribution on (0,1]. Each
potential bidder observes one of the signals. Then a sellernegotiating with two
bidders would optimally begin with a continuousEnglish auction. Each bidder, will
compute his strategy by averaging over all the possible values of the thirdsignal,
which in this case is equivalent to assuming that thissignal tikes on its expected
value of .Soeach bidder i would drop out in equilibrium ata price of 4(t1)2
whichwould be his value if his competitor also observed thesame signal. After one
bidder has dropped out, the remaining bidder jhasa value uniformly distributed
between D and 4(t1).Thisimplies that v5 =f(t1)(t1)and MR1 =(t1)(2t1
—1),
so MR1 =0=t=
4vj= =/DTh. Sothe seller should set a take-it-or-
leave-it price of ifthis exceeds D, that is, if D c1/8,but if D >then
the seller should simply agree to sell to jatthe dropout price D. The addition of
the take-it-or-leave-it price adds 6.25 percent to therevenue expected when there
are two bidders but no take-it-or-leave-it offer. But havinga third bidder and no
ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer would add 20 percent.8
6. Negotiations followed by an Auction
The seller cannot benefit by first negotiating with N bidderswhile reserving the
right to hold an auction among all N + 1 bidders if thenegotiations fail—this can
do no better than proceeding directly to an auction.(That is, it would be optimal
to set a take-it-or-leave-it price in the negotiationphase that is so high that it is
never accepted.)
The reason is that if the seller has the option ofresorting to the auction, it
will be obvious to all that if negotiations fail, there will bean auction. Viewing
the two-stage process as a whole, then, the seller is constrainedto choosing among
mechanisms that always lead to a sale. Butclearly any optimal mechanism that
The values are:=m fortwo bidders and no final take-it-or-leave-it offer;
for two bidders and a final take-it-or-leave-it offer, andjforthree bidders and
no final take-it-or-leave-it offer.
11always sells must always sell to the buyer with the highest signal. Therefore, it will
not be optimal to sell in the negotiation stage unless it is certain that the buyer's
signal is greater than or equal to the signal of the N + 1st bidder. Therefore the
seller should insist on a price in the negotiation phase that will only be accepted
when a buyer gets a signal of 1, which occurs with probability zero.
Therefore, under our assumptions, the seller should not accept any high "lock-
up" bid that a buyer may be willing to offer in return for not holding an auction
with an additional buyer.9
7. Multiple Units
If a seller is offering X identical goods for sale, then negotiating optimally with
N bidders each interested in buying one unit will yield lower expected revenue than
holding an auction that awards units to the top X among N + X bidders.
It is easy to generalize our analysis to show that the expected profits from the
auction equals the expected sum of the X highest valuesamong MR1 (T), MR2(T),...,
MRN+X(T), while expected profits from the negotiation are the expected sum of the
X highest values among MR(T),Mftt(T1),... ,MR(T')and X zeros!° It
follows as before that the auction yields greater expected profits.
This result would be unaffected by other bidders having costs of entering the
auction. (But the presence of such costs can explain why biddersmay jump bid
to deter competitors from entering; see Fishman (1988) and Png (1985). See also
Avery (1993), Daniel and Hirshleifer (1993), and von der Fehr (1993) for related
discussion.)
10 For this section only,we define T (ii,.. ., tjq.f,y) andwe define MRflTN)
iy..,x {MFt(T)}.
I See our forthcomingpaper, Bulow and IClemperer (1994), for a further analysis
of multiple unit auctions. Optimal negotiation is in general more complex than in
the single unit case since determining any bidder's MR requires knowing all other
bidders' signals. One way to achieve optimal negotiation is (i) ask each bidder i
to independently report his signal t (in equilibrium all reports will be honest),
and let t be the (X + 1)st highest signal reported; (ii) for each i who reports a
signal in the top X signals, compute is.t.MRflL1, ...t_1,ii, t1..',. .. ipi)=0and
sell to this bidder if t ￿ I, at the maximum of v(t1,. ..t1_1,1,t1+1,...tN)and
•ti—1,1, t1..1,.. trq).
12An interesting application of this result is to a competitive industry with con-
stant marginal costs c up to a fixed capacity X, and demand N at a price of c.
Provided the (industry) marginal revenue curve is downward sloping, the industry
would earn more revenue from a marketing program that multiplied demand hori-
zontally by the factor (N + X)/N, than it would earn from perfect collusion at the
monopoly price.
8. Non-independent Signals
Negotiating with One vs. Auctioning with Two
Affiliated signals reinforce our conclusion that an auction with two bidders is
more profitable than negotiating with a single bidder: Let G(xj, x2) be the prob-
ability that i1 ￿ x and t2 ￿ x2. Then, with affiliated signals, the probability
that 12￿x, conditional on Ii￿x, is greater than or equal to the unconditional
probability, 1 —x,that 12￿x, so we have
C(x,x) ￿ (1 —x)2.
ina standard ascending auction the expected revenue is just the minimum of
vi(ii,ti) and v2(12122). (Since bidder i would be pleased to win at any lower price
than ve(i,i) but would not wish to find himself the winner at any higher price.)
Therefore, the probability that the seller will earn at least vi(x, x) dollars is G(x, x),
and expected revenue can be written as
vi(O,O)+ .11dv1(xz)G(Xx)dx ￿ vi(O,O) + j'dvl(xx)(1
—x)2dx.
The right hand side of the above is the expected revenue when there is the
same unconditional distribution but independent draws. Therefore, since two in-
dependent bidders yield more revenue than optimally negotiating with one bidder,
two affiliated bidders in an auction must yield more revenue than one bidder in a
13negotiation.12
Negotiating With Multiple Bidden
When more than one bidder is available for a negotiation, and their signals are
not independent, a shrewd negotiator may be able to do better than an English
auction with continuously rising prices and a final take-it-or-leave-it offer.
As an example, consider a seller negotiating with two buyers. Each bidder
knows his own value precisely, v1 =A+ B and v2 =C+ B, where A, B, and C are
all distributed independently and uniformly on [0,1], but bidders do not know the
values of A, B, or C individually, so the observed variables v1 and v2 are affiliated.'3
Now consider the all-pay mechanism where each bidder submits a non-refundable
non-negative bid for the object, with the object going to the highest bidder. (That
is, if you bid 40 cents, then your payment is 40 cents, regardless of whether you win
the object or not.)
It is easy to show that the symmetric equilibrium bids are b(v1) = Re-
markably, each bidder's expected surplus is zero regardiless of his value, so the
expected revenue to the seller is the expected value of the higher of the two bidders,
which is 7/6. By comparison, adding a third symmetric bidder (with valuation
B + D with D also independently and uniformly distributed on [0,1)) would make
expected revenue equal to the expected second highest value of the three bidders,
that is, I, in an auction.
More generally, if a negotiator has the power to design mechanisms that extract
12 Affiliation implies correlation, but not vice-versa. With negative correlation
between the bidders' signals, negotiating with one may be more profitable than
auctioning with two. An example has 2, +t2 =1and any v1(T) satisfying vi(T) <2,
if 0<11< 1/2;vj(T) > 1/2 if t1>1/2.
13 In terms oft1 and2, this example translates to:
v1(T) =(2t)'2 0 ￿ i ￿ 1/2 i =1,2
v1(T) =2—(2(1 — 1/2 ￿ i ￿ I i =1,2
14all surplus, as in, for example, Cremer & McLean (1985), thenan extra bidder can
never make up for the loss of this power.14 However, in an example such as the one
above, a seller will do better with N +1 bidden in an auction than with N bidden
in an auction followed by an optimal negotiation with (that is, a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to) the last of the N bidden.
In particular, assume that each bidder i's signal derives from an independent
component x transformed by some common random function g(.), so each bidder
observes g(z€) and has value vi(g(xl),. ..,g(XN÷i)) Vi,such that it remains true
that the highest value bidder has the highest MR. (In our example above,9(11) =
z+ B, in which 11 =Aand x2 =C.)Then if the seller had perfect information
about g(•), her problem of setting the optimal reservation price at the end of the
game with N bidders would be just the same as in the independent signals case.
However, we know that even with an optimal take-it-or-leave-it offer contingenton
knowing g(.), the seller does worse in expectation than with the N + 1 bidden in
an auction. (Bidders are unaffected by whether or not they know g(.), withor
without a final take-it-or-leave-it offer, since their optimalstrategies depend only
on the actual signals, which are inferred exactly as when they are independent.) It
14 Forany given TN,relabelthe first N bidden so that ii ￿...￿ti. Then for
this T" an open auction with (N + 1) bidders yields
{vi(ij ,2,..•, tpi,ij) ItN+i ￿ tl}Prob(tN+I ￿ i')
+ EIN+1 {vN+1QN+l, t2,. . tjq, tN+l)fri > ij'J ￿ t2} ProbQi>N+1 ￿
+ E1,., {v2(t2, t2,. . . LN,tN+I)It! > tpj.f} Prob(i2>itj.)
whichis less than the value of extracting all the surplus from the highest of the
N bidders which is
Efl+,vIQ1,i2,...tN,tN÷l)
= {vi (ii, t2. .. tji,tN+1 )IiM+i￿i1} Prob(tpq1 ￿ ii)
+ {vi(ti, 2,•.Lp,r,tN+1)li1 > i+ ￿ t2 Prob(ti > tpq.t2)
+ {vi(ti,t2,.. .tN,tN+I)1i2> i,q÷i) Prob(t2 > iN4j).
15follows that, absent information about g('),theseller prefers auctioning with N + 1
to negotiating with N.
9. Asymmetric Bidders
With asymmetric bidders, the optimal negotiation would always entail sale to
the bidder with the highest positive MR., which may be different from the person
with the highest value. That is, the seller will choose a mechanism that discriminates
among buyers in the same way that a monopolist will price discriminate across
markets, equating MR rather than price. In this case, optimal negotiation may
succeed in achieving a higher expected MR and, therefore, a higher expected revenue
than an auction with an extra bidder.
For example, assume in a private values setting that v1(T) =lOOt1 andv2(T) =
50.Then, with either v3(T)= lOOt3or vs(T) =50,an auction with all three bidders
will yield expected revenue of 50,15Nowconsider an optimal negotiation with
bidden 1 and 2. The seller would give 1 a take-it-or-leave-it price of 75, promising
to sell to 2 for 50 if 1 turns her down. Expected revenue becomes .25(75) + .75(50) =
56.25.
10. "Irregular" Distributions
Our assumption of symmetric bidders, (A.6), does not by itself guarantee that
If v3(T) =50,then the value of the second highest bidder will always be 50,
and that will be the revenue from an auction, If v3(T) =lOOt3,one time in four
both vj(T) and v3(T) will be less than 50, and expected revenue will be the higher
of their two values, on average 33!, Similarly, once in four times both vi(T) and
vs(T) will exceed 50, and expected revenue will be the lower of the two values, on
average 66. Finally, fifty percent of the time v2(T) will be the second highest value,
and revenue will be 50. So total expected revenue is .(33k)+ (66k) + (50) =50. HThesuperior revenue would generally hold even if resale were permitted. The
seller could immediately get a take-it-or-leave-it price from buyer 2 of 56.25, and
leave it to 2 to offer I a take-it-or-leave-it price of 75, for example. (75 is the
optimal take-it-or-leave-it price for buyer 2 to demand from buyer 1 since buyer l's
MR is just equal to 50, buyer 2's value, if buyer l's value is 75.)
16the bidder with the highest signal will have the highest MR.'7 If assumption (A.$)
fails, then the bidder with the highest signal may not have the highest MR., and an
optimal negotiation might be preferable to an auction with an extra bidder.
For example, consider the following case:
—
3(1—li)—k•f ￿1 MR4(T):_k
90—li)33> •> lt,( )_—
I 1￿tj￿ MR1(T)=1
Optimal negotiation with N bidders with signals drawn independently from
this distribution involves setting a take-it-or-leave-it price of 1 (and any arbitrary
allocation among bidden willing to pay this price when there is more than one such
bidder18). Expected revenue is 1— A simple auction with N + 1 > 1 bidders
would yield only 1— — —
(l)N)19
11. Conclusions
When a company is approached by a potential buyer or buyers, its options may
be either to negotiate or to put the company up for auction. Our analysis implies
that if the board expects at least one extra serious bidder to appear in an auction,
then it should generally not negotiate and should directly begin an auction.
Of course, institutional considerations may make any given situation more com-
plex. For example, if allowing many bidders access to confidential financial infor-
The analog for monopoly is that, even though demand curves must be down-
ward sloping, MR curves may not be.
' Note that the distribution of values fora bidder is continuous in this example.
Strictly, we violate (A.7) for t1 ￿ 2/3, but by making v1(T) = I + e(t — )for
i > 2/3, small, we would have an example that satisfied all assumptions except
(A.8).
' With probability 1— (a)N+1thewinning bidder has a signal exceeding and
a MR of 1; with probability (k)N+l, no bidder's signal exceeds ,sothe winner's
MR is — 1withthe remaining probability, (1)"'— (l)N+1 thewinner's MR must
therefore equal —.Sothe expected MR of the winning bidder is (i — (1)"')+
1iN+I1 \ (2N+i— (i\N+I\(2 U)C3)+ I\3/U) p 3
17mation would cause the company's value to be diminished to the eventual buyer,
then one might wish to restrict bidding.
But remember that our analysis assumed that a seller could negotiate optimally,
making credible commitments of the sort that might not be possible in real life,
and we also assumed that bidders had no bargaining power in a negotiation. We
therefore believe that our basic result does not overstate the efficacy of auctions
relative to negotiations. Certainly a firm that refused to negotiate with a potential
buyer, and instead put itself up for auction, should be presumed to have exercised
reasonable business judgment.
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